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 Since emerging from the remains of the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia in 1991, Slovenia has enjoyed what is arguably the most 
successful path of all of the post-socialist states. In addition to a rapid 
consolidation of democratic rule (begun even before Slovenia declared its 
independence) and several routine transfers of power following free 
elections, Slovenia has experienced remarkable success in accomplishing its 
major foreign policy goals (Bukowski 2000). With this success it has raised 
its visibility both in Europe and globally and solidified its security in the 
most unstable part of the European continent. The core of Slovenia’s 
foreign policy strategy was simple—it sought membership in NATO and 
the European Union (EU). Both objectives were accomplished in 2004. 
Slovenia built on its EU accession success in 2006 when it became the first 
of the ten countries involved in the 2004 enlargement to adopt the Euro 
currency. It accomplished another first among the new entrants on 1 
January 2008 when it took on the six-month responsibility of the EU 
presidency. 
 This paper will assess Slovenia’s historic EU presidency in terms 
of its accomplishments and its significance for the country’s future foreign 
policy. A brief explanation of the presidency and its responsibilities will be 
offered followed by a description of Slovenia’s preparations for its 
presidency term. The paper will then review the major events that occurred 
during Slovenia’s term, focusing both on the outcome of these events and 
Slovenia’s efforts to guide the EU through to responses, if not solutions. 
Finally, the paper will assess Slovenia’s work in its role as the presidency 
country and seek to understand its experiences through two explanatory 
lenses first proposed by Elgstrom (2003) in his work on EU presidencies: 
country characteristics and actor expectations. In terms of country 
characteristics the key dimension in the case of Slovenia is country size. 
The very limited footprint Slovenia is able to cast in Europe provides an 
obvious analytical tool for understanding the course of Slovenia’s 
presidency. Elgstrom’s second analytical dimension utilizes actor 
expectations in terms of what was expected of Slovenia’s presidency by EU 
actors as well as expectations of the overall function of the position of the 
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Understanding the EU Presidency 
 The European Union presidency is in reality a generic term 
describing two official responsibilities that are held concurrently: the 
Presidency of the Council of Ministers and the Presidency of the European 
Council (Nugent 2003: 184). The Council of Ministers was established in 
1958 (the offshoot of the Special Council of Ministers of the European Coal 
and Steel Community) and is in itself generic in its membership.1 While 
each member state is represented at the Council, the individuals attending a 
particular meeting will vary according to the decision-making needs of the 
body. Under rules established in 2001 the Council can meet in up to nine 
different configurations.2 The national representative to the Council would 
be the minister with responsibility for the issue discussed. The Council 
stands as the primary intergovernmental decision-making component of the 
European Union (in contrast to the supranational aspect represented most 
visibly by the European Commission). The Council strives to make policy-
related decisions by consensus, sometimes resulting in extended 
negotiations and elaborate compromises. When consensus cannot be 
achieved, a qualified majority vote (QVM) is utilized. Under QVM 
procedures, each member state is assigned a number of votes determined 
roughly by the population of the state. The provisions for attaining a 
qualified majority are designed to ensure that a combination of large and 
small states support a proposal before it is passed. QVM thus prevents the 
bigger member states from forcing through a decision by virtue of their 
larger populations (McCormick 149–50).3 
 The European Council was a relatively late addition to the 
institutional structure of the EU. The governmental heads of the then-
European Communities (EC) met intermittently throughout the 1960s. At a 
summit in Paris in 1974 it was decided that these occasional summits 
                                                
1  Since 1993 the official designation of the Council of Ministers is “The Council 
of the European Union.” This name is easily confused with the European 
Council and as a result is rarely used outside of official proceedings and 
documents. For this reason, this paper will utilize Council of Ministers when 
referring to this body. 
2  The nine Council formations are General Affairs and External Relations; 
Economic and Financial Affairs; Justice and Home Affairs; Employment, 
Social Policy, Health and Consumer Affairs; Competitiveness; Transport, 
Telecommunications and Energy; Agriculture and Fisheries; Environment; 
Education, Youth and Culture (Nugent 154). 
3  Under the QVM process, Slovenia has four votes. Germany, the United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy, with twenty-nine votes, have the largest 
representation (McCormick 149). It is notable that while the nature of the 
Council is intergovernmental and thus designed to balance the supranational 
characteristics of the European Commission, the QVM is in itself a 
sovereignty-limiting activity. 
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should be turned into a regular activity. This gathering of the heads of 
government of the European Communities/European Union and the 
administrative support it required came to be called the European Council. 
The impetus for creating the European Council was the perception among 
the member states that the EC needed to be more nimble in its ability to 
respond to the growing number of challenges it faced and so required a 
mechanism that would bring the heads of government together on a regular 
basis. Initially the heads of government agreed to regular meetings three 
times a year; the rate was reduced to twice a year in 1986. Additional 
meetings may be held if the need arises. Over time the European Council 
has grown in influence and has become a key player in the EU policy-
making process (Nugent 2003: 178–81). 
 Despite drawing its identity from two different entities, the main 
characteristics of the EU presidency have become standardized. The 
presidency responsibility rotates among the member countries every six 
months: January–June and July–December. In order to at least partially 
overcome the disruptive effect of changing leadership twice a year, the EU 
makes use of a “troika” system in which each presidency country 
coordinates (or at least consults) with the countries holding the presidency 
immediately before and after it. Each troika attempts to establish a short list 
of common objectives that can be pursued even as the presidency changes 
hands. Given that virtually no policy initiative can be completed in a six-
month period, the troika gives some continuity to the policy process. In its 
original form, the rotation proceeded through the member states 
alphabetically. As the size of the EU grew (recall that the original European 
Communities had only six members), the process was modified to ensure a 
sort of balance of representation between larger and smaller states. The 
current order of rotation designates the presidency countries though 2020. It 
was finalized in 2007 and is designed to reflect the 2006 enlargement as 
well as the subsequent addition of Bulgaria and Romania. The latest 
arrangement maintains the earlier effort to place a larger country in the 
presidency at regular intervals, but also factors in geographical location, 
economic differences, and length of membership. These criteria ensure that 
each troika includes one of the EUs larger states as well as a state holding 
EU membership prior to 2006 (and thus with more experience in EU 
affairs—obviously both of these characteristics are often present in one 
country) (McCormick 2008: 141–42). 
 The responsibilities of the EU presidency are numerous, can 
significantly tax the foreign policy resources of smaller countries, and 
require a solid grasp of the subtleties of EU policy-making as well as the 
complexities of the EU bureaucracy and its myriad rules and regulations. 
The most important responsibility of the country holding the EU presidency 
is to organize and manage the work of the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers. This task includes setting the agendas for EU 
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meetings at a variety of levels, most importantly for the Council of 
Ministers and the Committee of Permanent Representatives. The latter 
(known as COREPER, which is derived from the French acronym for the 
Committee) consists of the heads of each member state’s permanent 
representation (the de facto embassy) to the EU in Brussels. In conjunction 
with this coordinating responsibility, the task of chairing the meetings of the 
Council of Ministers, COREPER, and all of the other council-related 
meetings falls to the presidency country. Overall a presidency country can 
expect to organize and chair nearly 4,000 meetings, including at least eight 
held at the ministerial level. In order to successfully accomplish this 
coordinating function, the presidency country is expected to act as a 
mediator and to facilitate bargaining among the members in order to solve 
problems and to move policy initiatives forward. The occupant of the 
presidency also represents the Council of Ministers in all meetings with 
other EU bodies (e.g. the European Commission—the administrative arm of 
the EU—and the European Parliament). In keeping with the joint origins of 
the role, all European Council summits are chaired (with accompanying 
responsibilities) by the country holding the presidency. Finally, the 
presidency country is charged with oversight of EU foreign policy including 
acting as the official voice of the EU, managing the EU position at 
international conferences or negotiations conducted by the EU, and 
representing the EU at summit-level meetings (McCormick 2008: 141; 
Nugent 2003: 157). 
 In its entirety the EU presidency carries broad responsibilities that 
require the expenditure of significant resources. Larger countries shoulder 
much of the burden themselves, but smaller states rely on appropriate EU 
bureaucracies for support4 and may even ask other member states for 
assistance. Members are not bound to accept the presidency role. In 1986 
Portugal, having just entered the EU, opted to forego its turn in the rotation. 
It felt it lacked both the diplomatic resources and the necessary expertise on 
EU affairs to successfully fulfill the responsibilities of the office 
(McCormick 2008: 143). 
 Holding the office of the presidency carries possible rewards as 
well as risks. The EU presidency brings considerable prestige and 
international attention to the country holding the office. This is a 
particularly significant benefit to the smaller countries of the EU. It is 
unlikely that a small state such as Slovenia will ever receive as much 
positive attention and visibility on the global stage as it did during its 
presidency term. The presidency potentially permits a country to have 
                                                
4  The European Council lacks a secretariat, so the primary source of 
administrative support is the General Secretariat of the Council of Ministers. It 
is made up of approximately 2,500 staff providing a wide range of 
administrative assistance (Nugent 2003: 160; 185). 
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considerable influence on the EU’s policy priorities. Although many issues 
are carried over from the previous presidency term (indeed, given the 
considerable length of time it takes for the EU to settle on many of its 
policies there can be carry over from several presidency terms), the 
presidency country can add a few new priorities it considers important as 
well as decide how existing issues will be prioritized at the many meetings 
it is expected to organize (keeping in mind its responsibility to conform to 
any preferences emerging from its troika arrangement). Another obvious 
limitation here is that in reality little of substance can be accomplished 
during a six-month period. If final agreement is reached on any major 
policy during a particular presidency it is generally due to the successful 
work of the preceding presidency (or presidencies). Finally, the completion 
of a successful presidency is likely to enhance a country’s reputation, both 
among European states and globally. An enhanced reputation may aid the 
country in achieving future foreign policy goals. 
 The risks endemic with holding the presidency are particularly 
germane to small states. In the first place, the numerous responsibilities of 
the office are very taxing on the administrative capabilities of even the 
largest states. Small states rely heavily on the assistance of European 
Council’s General Secretariat and still find their own ministerial 
bureaucracies to be heavily burdened. Second, in attempting to undertake 
the role of facilitator in EU discussions, a state may compromise efforts to 
achieve its own national goals for EU policy. Such circumstances could 
have a negative impact on the domestic political prospects of the governing 
parties at the time of the presidency term (Nugent 2003: 163–64) and 
beyond. Third, an unsuccessful presidency might hurt a country’s reputation 
both regionally and globally and affect its future ability to successfully 
pursue its foreign policy objectives. This represents a greater threat for a 
small state that may lack the ability and the resources to overcome such a 
handicap. 
 
Preparations for Slovenia’s presidency 
 The possibility that Slovenia could hold the EU presidency first 
emerged in November 2004, as Slovenia was in the process of forming a 
new government following general elections on 3 October. The proposal to 
include Slovenia in the presidency rotation emerged out of broader plans to 
reform the EU Constitution and alter the rotation to ensure a diverse 
selection of presidency countries following the EU’s substantial 
enlargement earlier that year (see explanation above). Then Prime Minister 
designate Janša indicated that he desired a vote by the country’s parliament, 
citing the costs involved with holding the office which he estimated at 60–
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80 million euros.5 On 17 November, the Slovenian National Assembly 
voted 71–0 to support Slovenia’s inclusion in the presidency rotation. The 
unanimous view among the respective party leaderships was that the long-
term benefits for Slovenia would exceed the short-term costs of managing 
the presidency.6 There was also informal agreement among the 
parliamentary parties that they would not permit politics to interfere with 
the operation of the presidency. This was an important concern since 
parliamentary elections were scheduled to be held less than four months 
after the conclusion of Slovenia’s proposed presidency term.7 
 Slovenia’s presidency term was confirmed by the EU Council of 
Ministers in December 2004 and incorporated into a new eighteen-month 
presidency program that included Germany and Portugal. The extended 
program would begin with Germany’s presidency in January 2007, 
followed by Portugal in July, and conclude with Slovenia’s term during the 
first half of 2008.8 The rationale behind the new “troika” arrangement was 
to allow three countries to jointly draft a work program that could be 
pursued over an eighteen-month period. It was hoped that this process 
would permit more continuity in policy and more time for program 
development. Preparations began just a month later in Ljubljana with the 
establishment of a government working group chaired by Prime Minister 
Janša as well as his foreign minister, finance minister, minister for Public 
Administration, and the state secretary for European Affairs.9 In July 2005 
Janša announced that the cost of the presidency would not exceed 60 
million euros, and in October a staffing plan was adopted that included 
assigning 1,200 government employees to tasks related to the presidency, 
adding 310 temporary employees to various government offices and 
increasing the size of Slovenia’s permanent representation mission in 
Brussels from forty-nine to 170.10 Also, a new conference center was to be 
built outside of Ljubljana at Brdo pri Kranju to handle the many EU 
meetings that would be held in Slovenia—although the vast majority of the 
meetings taking place during Slovenia’s presidency would occur in 
Brussels. This conference center would be the only major facilities-related 
expense of Slovenia’s presidency. 
 In April 2006 Germany, Portugal, and Slovenia began negotiations 
aimed at developing a draft program to be implemented by their respective 
presidencies. The following troika of France, the Czech Republic, and 
                                                
5  STA, 9 November 2004. 
6  STA, 17 November 2004. 
7  Financial Times, 18 December 2007, p. 25. 
8  STA, 13 December 2004. 
9  Television Slovenia. 6 January 2005, translated by BBC Monitoring, 11 
January 2008.  
10  STA, 6 October 2005. 
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Sweden was also consulted. The program was released in December at a 
meeting in Berlin. In conjunction with the plan, Foreign Minister Rupel 
described four issues that would be the focus of Slovenia’s presidency: 
ratification of an EU constitutional treaty, enlargement (particularly into the 
western Balkans), climate change and energy policy, and intercultural 
dialog.11 Subsequent discussions resulted in adding implementation of the 
Lisbon Strategy12 as a fifth priority.13 
 
Slovenia’s EU Presidency 
 Almost from the time Slovenia’s presidency term was finalized, 
concern emerged throughout Europe as to whether such a small country was 
up to the task. One unnamed Slovene diplomat described Slovenia’s goal 
for running the EU presidency as simply “Just not screw it up.”14 Slovenia 
would become the smallest state to assume the presidency while relying 
primarily on its own governmental personnel.15 Cognizant of the resources 
necessary to complete its responsibility, the Janša government announced 
its intention to run a “commission presidency” meaning that it would 
depend heavily on the EU bureaucracy for advice and administrative 
support. Also, since Slovenia maintained a limited number of embassies, it 
reached agreement with France to use its embassies for activities associated 
with the representation of EU interests abroad.16 
 The first major event related to Slovenia’s presidency took place 
on 8 January 2008 at its new conference center in Brdo pri Kranju when it 
hosted a meeting with key members of the European Commission. In 
addition to reviewing Slovenia’s presidency objectives, Foreign Minister 
Rupel also announced the formation of an EU task force for Serbia that 
would include individuals from Slovenia’s presidency as well as 
representatives from the subsequent French presidency, the European 
Commission and the European Council. The aim of the task force was to 
facilitate Serbia’s efforts to join the EU—in keeping with Slovenia’s wish 
to include the Western Balkans in any future EU enlargement. Minister 
Rupel indicated Slovenia’s desire to have Serbia sign a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement (SAA) with the EU during Slovenia’s presidency, 
although he noted the importance of gaining Serbia’s full cooperation with 
                                                
11  STA, 5 December 2006. 
12  The Lisbon Strategy was adopted by the EU in 2000 and commits the member 
states to making the EU’s economy more competitive globally. 
13  A more complete description of Slovenia’s presidency priorities can be found 
at www.eu2008.si/en/The_Council_Presidency/Priorities_Programmes/index.html. 
14  Economist, 18 November 2006. 
15  Luxembourg has held the EU presidency several times, but it relies heavily on 
France and Germany for staffing. 
16  Financial Times, 18 December 2007. 
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the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia before the 
SAA could become a reality. In this regard, he said, “new assessments” 
were needed.17 Prime Minister Janša used the meeting to call attention to 
the problem of Kosovo’s anticipated declaration of independence. 
Apparently he hoped to lower expectations about the EU’s reaction to 
Kosovo’s aspirations by remarking that he did not expect the EU reach a 
consensus on Kosovo’s independence. Janša instead called attention to the 
EU’s pending approval of the EULEX (European Union Rule of Law 
Mission in Kosovo)18 force as the product of a united EU.19 
 At the same time as the meeting at Brdo pri Kranju, Slovenia’s 
first dedicated effort toward achieving its announced presidency goals 
commenced with the staging of a two-day international conference to mark 
the beginning of the European Year of Intercultural Dialogue. The 
conference included remarks by the European Commissioner for Education, 
Training, Culture and Youth and the President of the European Parliament 
as well as Prime Minister Janša and Slovenia’s President Danilo Türk 
(Slovenian Presidency of the EU, 8 January 2008). 
 Slovenia made progress on another of its EU policy emphases on 
23 January when the European Commission put forward a directive on 
renewable energy and climate change. More commonly referred to as the 
energy and climate change package, the directive had its origins in a 
proposal made a year earlier that the EU undertake specific efforts to reduce 
greenhouse gas emissions. Emissions reduction targets were set in January 
2007 and the targets were approved at the European Council summit in 
March. The Commission then began the long process of drafting rules that 
would allow the targets to be met. The January 2008 directive is significant 
in that, among other things, it largely kept intact the initial targets (“Memo,” 
23 January 2008). Although this outcome is a consequence of many factors 
playing out over the course of nearly twelve months of bargaining, Slovenia 
was able to enjoy the good fortune of having the directive issued during its 
presidency. Following the Commission’s release of the directive, Slovenia, 
in its role as the presidency country, immediately initiated negotiations 
aimed at gaining approval by the European Council. This would be a long 
process that would not conclude before the end of Slovenia’s presidency 
term, but facilitating the negotiations can be included as an element of 
Slovenia’s presidency goals. 
 The advantages of holding the EU presidency were evident in the 
outcome of the Council of Ministers meeting attended by EU foreign 
                                                
17  STA, 8 January 2008. 
18  The EULEX mission, approved by the EU Council on 16 February 2008, will 
eventually consist of nearly 1,800 judges, police officers, prosecutors, and 
customs officials who will assist their counterparts in Kosovo. 
19  Die Welt, 8 January 2008. 
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ministers on 18 February in Brussels. Less than twenty-four hours before 
the meeting, Kosovo’s Provisional Assembly had approved an 
independence declaration for the province. While the declaration was a 
prominent subject of the Council meeting, it is notable that the first joint 
statement released by the ministers was a reaffirmation of the Council’s 
conclusions of December 2007 that essentially sided with Slovenia in its 
dispute with Croatia regarding the status of the waters off Slovenia’s 
coast.20 The following month the Croatian parliament complied with the 
Council’s request. On the one hand, this exchange represented a clear gain 
for Slovenia, and likely one that it would not have attained solely through 
bilateral negotiations. On the other hand, it is likely that using its presidency 
status to push the Croatian issue to the top of the meeting’s agenda, led to 
some dissatisfaction on the part of many of the EU’s members. One 
diplomat familiar with the situation noted that “It is frowned on to use your 
membership of [sic] the EU to blatantly achieve your national ends and it’s 
definitely frowned on to use the presidency for your own purposes.”21 
 The same Council of Ministers meeting also addressed Kosovo’s 
independence declaration. Prime Minister Janša’s prediction of the previous 
month proved correct, as Slovenia was unable to lead the ministers to a 
unanimous response. In the end, five of the EU’s twenty-seven members 
chose not to recognize Kosovo’s independence. Foreign Minister Rupel 
tried to put a positive spin on the disappointing outcome by declaring that 
“The European Union has once again successfully passed the test showing 
its unity and adopted a common view on recent developments in Kosovo.” 
The “unity” described by Rupel rested in the ministers taking “note” of 
Kosovo’s declaration and that the declaration included “provisions on 
democracy and equality of citizens, as well as the protection of the Serbian 
                                                
20  Financial Times, 20 February 2008, p. 10. The status of Slovenia’s coastal 
waters is part of a larger dispute between Slovenia and Croatia that 
encompasses maritime and land borders as well as other issues. Space does not 
permit a discussion of these issues in their entirety. In the case of the Council of 
Ministers declaration of February 18, 2008, the issue concerned Croatia’s 
establishment and enforcement of an ecological and fisheries protection zone 
which restricted Slovenia’s access to the Adriatic and severely limited Slovene 
(and Italian) commercial fishing in the area covered by the zone. In June 2004, 
Croatia agreed that the zone would not be enforced against EU members while 
negotiating an amended relationship with the EU. In 2007 Croatia appeared to 
reverse that stand. The Council of Ministers responded on December 10, 2007 
by calling on Croatia to respect its 2004 agreement. This statement was made in 
the context of the Council of Minister’s findings with respect to Croatia’s 
efforts to join the EU, so the contents of the statement had implications beyond 
the simple expression of disappointment. The February 18 statement reiterated 
the initial finding and indicated that the Ministers would “return to this matter 
at a forthcoming meeting” (Council of the European Union, 18 February 2008). 
21  Financial Times, 20 February 2008. 
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and other minorities” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs). For its part, the 
Slovenian Parliament voted to recognize Kosovo on 5 March by a vote of 
57–4. Rupel remarked that Slovenia’s decision should not be regarded as an 
attempt to oppose Serbian interests, but rather was a matter of placing 
Slovenia in conformity with European Union policy.22  
 Slovenia chaired the first of the two European Council summits in 
Brussels on 13 and 14 March. The outcome of these summits is rarely in 
doubt since any necessary agreements are brokered in advance. The most 
notable outcome of this summit was the launching of the second three-year 
cycle of the EU’s Lisbon Strategy to improve the economic competitiveness 
of the region (European Council, 13/14 March 2008). The new cycle was 
essentially a reconfirmation of the initial cycle, but the outcome conformed 
to one of Slovenia’s stated objectives for its presidency term. 
 Slovenia’s objective of using its presidency to extend EU 
enlargement into the western Balkans was the focus of an “informal” 
meeting of EU foreign ministers at the conference center in Brdo pri Kranju 
held 28 and 29 March 2008.23 The ministers held meetings and heard 
presentations from representatives of Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia. The meeting was 
attended by the EU’s Commissioner for Enlargement Olli Rehn who 
discussed the European Commission’s latest set of proposals designed to 
enhance cooperation between the EU and the states of the western Balkans. 
Among the proposals were the listing of steps designed to lead to visa-free 
travel between the region and the EU. In conjunction with the meeting, 
Slovenia’s EU presidency office issued a statement drawing attention to the 
Commission’s efforts and specifically calling on Serbia’s leaders to 
“confirm their commitment to the European perspective.”24 In this regard, 
Slovenia was continuing its efforts to coax Serbia toward the EU in the 
midst of Serbia’s contentious parliamentary election campaign scheduled to 
culminate on 11 May. Slovenia was anxious to provide the pro-European 
elements running in the election with useful, if not substantial, gestures that 
would improve their electoral fortunes. 
 A key element in Slovenia’s efforts to assist the pro-European 
parties in Serbia was encouraging the EU to conclude a Stabilization and 
Association Agreement with Belgrade (SAA). The SAA would bring a 
                                                
22  STA, 5 March 2008. 
23  At the time of Slovenia’s presidency, EU foreign ministers would gather once 
during each presidency term for an informal meeting. These meetings were 
designated as “informal” because they were not expected to produce official 
statements. Rather, informal meetings represented an opportunity for the 
ministers to exchange views on issues chosen by the presidency country in an 
effort to facilitate subsequent policy decisions. 
24  STA, 29 March 2008. 
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significant increase in the level of cooperation between Serbia and the EU, 
and more importantly would be regarded as the critical first step in the long 
process that could allow Serbia to become an EU member. The major 
stumbling block to signing the SAA was opposition by the Netherlands and 
other member states, who were insisting that Serbia do more to cooperate 
with the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). 
As Serbia’s election day drew closer (along with the prospects for a victory 
by radical Serbian nationalists), Slovenia’s preference won out. The SAA 
was signed on 29 April at a ceremony in Brussels; however, it was noted 
that ratification of the agreement (and thus implementation) would not take 
place until Serbia cooperated more completely with the ICTY. The Slovene 
daily Večer described the gesture and its apparent intent as “Pre-Election 
Candy.”25 This small success for Slovenia may have had the desired effect 
on the Serbian electorate. On 11 May, a pro-Western coalition of political 
parties, somewhat unexpectedly, prevailed over nationalist parties.26  
 Slovenia’s efforts to encourage EU enlargement into the western 
Balkans received a further boost on 16 June, when Bosnia-Herzegovina 
signed its SAA with the EU. With the conclusion of Stabilization and 
Association Agreements with Serbia and Bosnia, all of the territories of the 
former Yugoslavia except Kosovo, had now made at least the first step 
toward EU accession.27 
 While not receiving extensive publicity, Slovenia’s presidency was 
marked by two notable developments during the early part of June. On 7 
June, Slovenia helped bring to conclusion a long series of negotiations 
aimed at liberalizing the EU’s energy market. The negotiations were 
complex and involved high stakes, with Germany and France expressing 
skepticism at efforts to promote more competition. In the end a 
liberalization process was approved, but with safeguards to satisfy the EU’s 
two largest members.28 An even longer set of negotiations (going back to 
2004) were concluded under Slovenia’s guidance on 10 June, when a 
compromise was reached on EU labor rules. Britain had long sought the 
right to opt-out of efforts to cap the standard work week at forty-eight hours 
and the EU membership finally agreed to this demand—although Spain and 
four other states were very vocal in expressing their disappointment with 
the compromise.29 Both of these agreements represent major successes for 
Slovenia and its presidency, however, neither compromise can be 
implemented until they are approved by the European Parliament. 
                                                
25  STA, 30 April 2008. 
26  Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. 12 May 2008. 1 June 2009 www.rferl.org/ 
content/article/1117467.html. 
27  Financial Times, 17 June 2008, p. 2. 
28  Financial Times, 17 June 2008, p. 2. 
29  Financial Times, 10 June 2008, p. 4. 
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 The most visible event hosted by Slovenia during its presidency 
took place on 10 June. The annual EU-US summit was held in Brdo pri 
Kranju. Given the many issues that divided the EU (and most of the EU’s 
members) and the US, expectations for the summit were modest. A strong 
effort was made to highlight the positive nature of the overall relationship 
between the two powers with the summit declaration calling the EU-US 
connection “the most significant bilateral economic relationship in the 
world.”30 Nevertheless both sides acknowledged that differences exited on 
major issues. With little expected in terms of the outcome, Slovenia’s 
challenge for the summit was to primarily ensure that the event was run 
smoothly. In this it was successful, especially with the advantage of holding 
the summit at the relatively remote conference center site outside of 
Ljubljana in order to reduce the exposure of the unpopular President Bush 
to the Slovene public and others. The newspaper Večer remarked on the 
general candor expressed by both sides about their differences, and Dnevnik 
titled its commentary on the summit, “A Decent Ending.”31 
 Slovenia had barely two days to recover from the summit when 
Ireland, in a referendum held on 12 June, rejected the so-called Lisbon 
Treaty. This treaty represented the second attempt by the EU to make 
significant revisions in its governing processes. The current institutional 
decision-making processes were developed when the EU had a much 
smaller membership. Now, with twenty-seven members, policy-making in 
the EU has become extraordinarily cumbersome, time-consuming, and 
largely limited to incremental decisions. An initial effort to streamline 
decision-making procedures was rejected by Dutch and French voters in 
2005, and a revised Treaty was agreed to in late 2007. In order for the treaty 
to go into effect, all twenty-seven members would have to complete 
national ratification procedures. In most cases, Slovenia included, 
ratification required only parliamentary approval, but other states were 
committed to national referenda.32 Prime Minister Janša accepted the results 
of the Irish vote with regret and announced that the EU heads of state would 
meet in Brussels the following week to assess the situation. Janša reiterated 
the necessity of the Treaty and observed that two-thirds of the member 
states had already ratified it.33 In reality, there was little Slovenia (or any 
country holding the presidency) could do about this development. If the EU 
presidency been held by one of the larger states, the expression of regret 
may have had more gravitas, but the outcome of the vote would not have 
changed. 
                                                
30  STA, 10 June 2008. 
31  STA, 11 June 2008. 
32  Slovenia’s Parliament ratified the Lisbon Treaty on 29 January 2008. 
33  STA, 13 June. 
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 With the failure of the Irish referendum, some observers were of 
the opinion that EU plans for further enlargement would be abandoned or at 
least suspended. Indeed, this view was expressed by French President 
Sarkozy during the European Council meeting held the week following the 
Irish vote. This would have been a particularly strong blow to Croatia, 
whose membership application was further along than any other of the EU 
hopefuls. Speaking at the same meeting, Prime Minister Janša indicated his 
preference that enlargement plans move forward while the EU sought a new 
solution to its governing dilemma.34 This view eventually prevailed. 
 Slovenia used the regularly scheduled summit of the European 
Council (19–20 June 2008) to make one final effort to reinforce the EU’s 
commitment to enlargement into the western Balkans. The Council’s 
official conclusions include an expression of support for the ongoing efforts 
to draw the region closer to the EU and a reaffirmation of the finding that 
all states in the region have the opportunity to achieve candidacy status. 
Perhaps more importantly, Slovenia arranged for an annex to be added to 
the summit’s conclusions. The annex outlines generic and sometimes 
specific initiatives that the EU should take in the areas of enhanced regional 
cooperation, the facilitation of people-to-people contacts, and the 
strengthening of social and economic development in the region. All of 
these endeavors are designed to underpin the more general goal of 
furthering good governance (European Council, 19/20 June 2008). The 
inclusion of the annex represents a tangible effort by Slovenia to maintain, 
if not enhance, the EU’s interest in the western Balkans. With the second 
failure of the EU’s efforts to reform its governing mechanism, there existed 
the real possibility that most of the organization’s membership would lose 
interest in further enlargement. Slovenia’s actions were meant to ensure that 
neither the EU’s bureaucracy nor its membership would neglect the states of 
former Yugoslavia. 
 The final major event of Slovenia’s presidency was the annual 
two-day summit with Russia held on 26 and 27 June 2008. The meeting 
took place in the Siberian city of Khanty-Mansiysk. The challenge for 
Slovenia, as the presidency country, was to gain the approval of the EU 
membership to commence talks with Russia with the intent of negotiating a 
new strategic partnership between the two entities that would be more 
reflective of the current economic and geo-political situation (the previous 
partnership agreement was more than ten years old).35 This effort had been 
on hold for nearly two years due to various objections from some of the EU 
members of central Europe. When Slovenia assumed the presidency, 
Lithuania represented the biggest obstacle to gaining approval for new 
                                                
34  Television Slovenia, 20 June 2008, translated by BBC Monitoring, 24 June 
2008. 
35  Formally, the pact will be titled “Partnership and Cooperation Agreement.” 
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partnership talks (with some support from Latvia and Estonia), and its 
objections continued through a 29 April meeting of EU foreign ministers. 
Lithuania’s objections centered on issues of energy delivery from Russia 
and on the need for partnership talks to directly address the so-called 
“frozen conflicts” related to Georgia and Moldova.36 Subsequent talks with 
Lithuania involving representatives from Slovenia and the European 
Commission finally led to a compromise and at a meeting in Brussels on 26 
May the EU foreign ministers reached a formal agreement on pursuing EU-
Russia partnership and cooperation talks.37 The summit itself went smoothly 
and concluded with the announcement that the two sides would commence 
talks the following month aimed at reaching a new Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement to replace the one concluded in 1997. At the 
closing ceremony, Russian President Medvedev specifically complimented 
Prime Minister Janša for his preparatory his work, which he noted would 
allow the new partnership talks to begin.38 
 With the mandate to pursue a new partnership and cooperation 
agreement, Slovenia’s final presidency function can be regarded as a 
significant success. The need for a new agreement was widely recognized, 
and the two-year delay in launching talks was a major impediment to 
building better relations between the two most important strategic actors on 
the European continent.39 
 On 30 June 2008 Slovenia handed over the presidency role to 
France. During its six-month presidency more than 8,000 EU events took 
place, 283 of which were held in Slovenia. These events involved the work 
of 2,720 Slovenian civil servants, 133 special participants, and 245 students. 
The total cost to Slovenia was €62.4 million (Slovenian Presidency of the 
European Union, 30 June 2008). 
 
Slovenia’s presidency assessed 
 By most measures, Slovenia’s presidency experience was 
successful. At the very least, Slovenia met the expectations of the unnamed 
Slovenian diplomat quoted at the beginning of this paper who hoped only 
that Slovenia would “Just not screw it up.” Slovenia proved that the concern 
held by some in Brussels that it was not up to the task was misplaced as it 
successfully handled both the routine and extraordinary demands of the 
presidency role. 
                                                
36  Diena (Riga), 2 May 2008. 
37  Financial Times, 27 May 2008, p. 7. 
38  STA, 27 June 2008. 
39  Financial Times, 28 June 2008, p. 12. 
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 In terms of the more routine issues, the most notable are the 
advancement of the European Commission’s directive on renewable energy 
and climate change, an agreement on the liberalization of the EU’s energy 
market, and an agreement on EU labor rules. The issuance of the directive 
came only three weeks into Slovenia’s presidency. For this reason, it is not 
plausible to assign Slovenia with the preponderance of the credit for the 
completion of this task. Nevertheless, the last stages of the directive were 
completed during the Slovenian presidency, allowing it to be considered as 
part of Ljubljana’s EU legacy. It is notable that the goals of the directive 
largely reflected the targets set by the European Council ten months earlier. 
Targets or preferences expressed by the European Council do not always 
translate as expected into Commission directives. As noted earlier, once the 
directive was issued, Slovenia quickly commenced negotiations within the 
Council of Ministers over the contents of the directive as part of the first 
step toward getting the directive approved by the European Parliament, thus 
allowing it to become policy. This complex process would take several 
months to complete and so whatever was accomplished in the negotiations 
under Slovenia’s auspices would not be recognized as part of its presidency 
accomplishments. 
 As with the renewable energy and climate change directive, 
Slovenia must receive some recognition for the completion of negotiations 
on energy market liberalization and on labor rules. Both of these 
negotiations had dragged through several presidencies, and it is impossible 
to determine how much responsibility can be fairly credited to Slovenia for 
bringing them to closure in June 2008. Since the talks carried through most 
of Slovenia’s presidency, it would be reasonable to assign Slovenia at least 
some recognition. 
 Although these three accomplishments have been described here as 
routine, it would be wrong to view them as being of minor importance. 
While they did not receive the broad press coverage of the summits, for 
example, all three represent important public policy endeavors that will 
involve the commitment of significant amounts of resources. 
 The two most visible activities of Slovenia’s presidency were the 
EU-US and the EU-Russia summits. The former was sensibly approached 
as primarily an effort at damage control. For obvious reasons nothing was 
expected of this summit, and Slovenia fully met the challenge of ensuring 
that it was conducted without incident. Regarding the latter, Slovenia’s 
preparatory work paid off. Under its direction, Slovenia was able to ensure 
a positive outcome for the summit by persuading Lithuania to drop its 
resistance to commencing new partnership negotiations between the EU and 
Russia. As with other EU negotiations, it is difficult to attribute a particular 
level of influence to Slovenia over the process of reaching an agreement 
among the EU members to engage Russia, but given the sensitivity of the 
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issue as well as the length of time it took to resolve it, one can reasonably 
assign considerable credit to Slovenia and its diplomats for permitting the 
summit to end in such a positive manner. 
Kosovo’s independence declaration easily represented the greatest 
unscheduled challenge of Slovenia’s presidency term. The declaration was 
not unexpected, but it was unwanted.40 However, Slovenia was uniquely 
qualified to deal with this challenge—understanding the issues and the 
actors better than any other EU state. Ideally, Slovenia would have hoped 
for all twenty-seven of the member states to announce their plans to 
recognize Kosovo’s independence. However, as noted above, Janša and 
Rupel understood from the beginning of Slovenia’s presidency that a 
unanimous stand would be impossible. Nevertheless, Slovenia should 
receive credit for acting quickly and generating the most positive response 
possible, even if Rupel’s remarks at the end of the meeting about Europe’s 
“unity” and its “common view” on the situation were overstated. 
In terms of its stated objectives, Slovenia could claim at least some 
success on four of its five priorities. At least partially through Slovenia’s 
efforts, the EU experienced positive developments in enlargement toward 
the western Balkans, climate change and energy policy, intercultural 
dialogue, and the Lisbon Strategy. It was deeply disappointing for Slovenia 
to watch Irish voters reject the EU’s proposed treaty on governance, but it 
should be noted that during Slovenia’s presidency many other countries—
including Slovenia—did ratify the treaty. 
Among EU observers, the evaluation of Slovenia’s presidency was 
overwhelmingly positive, although it should be reiterated that few, if any, 
observers had high expectations for Slovenia’s presidency and some felt 
that it was a mistake to make the choice in the first place.41  
The Financial Times noted that several significant developments 
occurred during Slovenia’s tenure in office and described its role in these 
achievements as “useful but modest.” It observed that Ireland’s failure to 
approve the Lisbon Treaty was in no way the fault of Slovenia and regretted 
that this event “overshadowed a number of achievements” that could be 
credited to Slovenia’s presidency. The newspaper also noted that Slovenia 
was able to make good use of its intimate knowledge of the western 
                                                
40  In what may have been a misguided effort to persuade Kosovo to postpone its 
plans for independence, Foreign Minister Rupel told a German radio network 
on January 11 that he did not think Kosovo would declare independence (Koha 
Ditore [Pristina], 13 January 2008, p. 4 [translated by BBC Monitoring, 17 
January 2008]). 
41  The Slovene government’s own summary of its presidency achievements can 
be found at: www.eu2008.si/en/News_and_Documents/Press_Releases/June/0630SVEZ 
dosezki.html.  
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Balkans, both in its handling of the Kosovo independence issue and in the 
way that it guided the EU’s delicate relationship with Serbia.42 The pro-
Europe outcome of Serbia’s parliamentary election in May 2008 is 
remarkable given that most EU members chose to recognize Kosovo’s 
independence. Some credit must be given to Slovenia’s successful efforts to 
arrange for the signing of Serbia’s Stabilization and Association Agreement 
with the EU shortly before those elections. 
 The European Policy Centre in Brussels observed that Slovenia’s 
presidency came at a difficult time for the EU, but that Ljubljana managed 
its challenges well. The Centre highlighted Slovenia’s successful use of the 
European Commission. This observation mirrors Slovenia’s pre-presidency 
declaration noted above that it would conduct a “Commission presidency.” 
The Centre’s report suggests that continued EU interest in the western 
Balkans may be the biggest legacy of Slovenia’s presidency (23 June 2008). 
 Diplomats in Brussels generally expressed approval of Slovenia’s 
performance, while acknowledging that Slovenia’s small size handicapped 
its ability to function robustly. Slovenia made good use of its expertise in 
the Balkans region, relied on the capabilities of the Commission where 
necessary, and avoided getting involved in complex topics that it lacked the 
ability to deal with such as financial market reform and regulation.43 
European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso assessed Slovenia’s 
term favorably and remarked the “If all the member states applied the same 
principles [as Slovenia], the European Union would overcome many of its 
difficulties.”44 
 Slovenia’s presidency, and the success of that presidency, brought 
it several benefits. Without question, Slovenia’s reputation within the EU 
will be enhanced both within the Commission and its attendant and massive 
bureaucracy as well as among the member states themselves. This boost in 
reputation should aid Slovenia in the future as it promotes its interests 
within the EU. Pursuing its EU interests will be facilitated by the 
knowledge Slovenia has gained of the EU’s many complex processes. This 
knowledge will improve the capabilities of the Slovenian officials that 
handle EU affairs and should provide Slovenia with an advantage over the 
other recent EU entrants in terms of pursuing interests and utilizing EU 
programs to the fullest extent possible. The many personal contacts that 
Slovenian officials made in Brussels as a result of the presidency experience 
will also be beneficial. With a successful presidency behind it, Slovenia is 
likely to experience modest benefits to its overall foreign policy endeavors, 
having increased both its reputation and visibility on the global stage. 
                                                
42  Financial Times, 27 June 2008, p. 2. 
43  Financial Times, 27 June 2008, p. 2. 
44  Deutsche Welle, 30 June 2008, 8 June 2009 www.dwworld.de/dw/article/ 
0,2144,3449880,00.html 
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 An important factor in Slovenia’s success is due to the domestic 
political arrangements that prevailed before and during its presidency term. 
As noted above, when the issue of Slovenia receiving an EU presidency 
term first arose, all of the country’s major political parties supported the 
idea and informally agreed to refrain from letting domestic political 
concerns interfere with issues related to Slovenia’s presidency. By-and-
large this agreement held. This allowed Slovenia to begin preparations for 
its term at an early stage and for those preparations to move forward at a 
steady pace. Slovenia, therefore, was well prepared when its presidency 
term commenced in January 2008. 
 Prime Minister Janša deserves credit for his competent 
management both in preparing Slovenia for the challenge of the presidency 
and for his work in guiding the country through its term. It is likely that a 
lack of domestic political interference aided Janša in his work. Janša also 
deserves credit for his willingness to cooperate extensively with the various 
bureaucracies of the European Commission. It would have been easy for 
him to overestimate how much of the presidency responsibility Slovenia 
could comfortably handle, but he and his staff made a realistic assessment 
of Slovenia’s capabilities and expertise and relied heavily on the 
Commission for many administrative matters. 
Foreign Minister Rupel also performed his role well and aided in 
Slovenia’s success. His reputation in Brussels and Ljubljana as an 
individual prone to brusque behavior caused some concern over how he 
would fare in the difficult role of chairing the meetings of foreign ministers. 
These concerns did not materialize, however, and there is little evidence 
that his performance was anything other than helpful. 
A review of Slovenia’s work during its presidency does yield one 
issue that might harm its standing in the European Union. Slovenia’s efforts 
to highlight its boundary dispute with Croatia during the meeting of EU 
foreign ministers in Brussels on 18 February appear to have created ill will 
among some member states. As noted earlier, presidency countries have the 
responsibility to set the agenda for most EU meetings. It is expected that 
presidency countries will use this responsibility wisely by, among other 
things, not entangling the EU in issues that primarily impact the presidency 
country. By pushing its concern over Croatia’s enforcement of an ecological 
and fisheries protection zone to the top of the meeting agenda (even ahead 
of Kosovo’s declaration of independence), Slovenia was perceived by some 
as violating its position of trust. On the other hand, the public record 
suggests that beyond this foreign ministers meeting, Slovenia did little to 
use its presidency authority to advantage itself in its dispute with Croatia. 
While the foreign ministers did responsibly side with Slovenia on the 
protection zone issue, Rupel’s (and Janša’s) move may have cost Slovenia 
future good will on the boundary issue, since the dispute over territorial 
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waters is far from being settled. Slovenia will have to rely on the good will 
of several EU members if it is to favorably resolve its border issues with 
Croatia prior to that country’s accession to the EU. 
 
Conclusions 
 Elgstrom’s (2003) two analytical lenses for understanding EU 
presidencies, country characteristics and actor expectations, provide useful 
tools for assessing Slovenia’s experience. 
In terms of country characteristics, the operative variable in this 
case is Slovenia’s small size. As noted above, the small size of Slovenia’s 
bureaucratic resources and diplomatic presence, made it impossible for it to 
undertake the full scope of EU presidential responsibilities. Janša’s 
government recognized this limitation when it acknowledged that it would 
conduct a “Commission presidency.” As a result, much of the presidency-
related administrative work was carried out, under Slovenian guidance, by 
bureaucrats associated with the European Commission. France, which 
would follow Slovenia to the EU presidency, was asked to represent 
Slovenia’s presidency in the many countries where Slovenia did not 
maintain a diplomatic presence. 
 Slovenia’s reliance on the European Commission carried an 
additional advantage. As a new entrant, Slovenia was relatively 
inexperienced with the byzantine EU bureaucracy and with its equally 
complex administrative procedures. In relying on the Commission, Slovenia 
could ensure that administrative mistakes would be minimized and that 
critical meetings would not be hindered by incomplete or inept preparation. 
 Small size should not be considered only a handicap. The benign 
domestic political environment that was created for presidency-related 
issues can be understood as the result of Slovenia’s small and manageable 
political system. This environment facilitated the county’s effective 
preparation for the presidency and allowed Janša to oversee the presidency 
with a minimum of political interference. 
 The actor expectations approach seeks to understand how a state 
conducts its presidency in terms of what is anticipated of that experience. 
These expectations can be based on the office itself and on the country that 
will occupy that office. Elgstrom writes that “Expectations are powerful 
determinants of what is considered to be appropriate Presidency behavior” 
(2003: 13). Without question, little was expected of Slovenia’s presidency 
and some feared the endeavor would fail entirely. The Slovenian 
government could not have been unaware of this perception. To some 
extent, accepting the presidency was a risk, since failure would be 
especially poorly-tolerated by the many skeptical EU members. On the 
other hand, taking on the presidency with such limited expectations meant 
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that anything Slovenia did accomplish would count as a benefit. In this 
sense Slovenia has demonstrated that even small states can have relative 
success in the EU and with the EU presidency. The designation of 
Slovenia’s presidency as a success is, of course, tempered by the realization 
that the amount of substantive accomplishments was not great. But there 
was the perception of quality in the execution of the presidency, which 
permitted Slovenia to acquire an improved reputation within the EU. The 
lesson for other small states should be that quality and competence matter. 
This may be particularly important to small states that are new to the EU 
and have not yet had sufficient time to build a reputation among the rest of 
the EU membership. 
Understanding the expectations of its office and its own limitations 
as a small state shed light on Slovenia’s presidency. Slovenia made a 
realistic assessment of its capabilities, took advantage of the flexibility 
inherent in its small size and arguably met or exceeded the expectations of 
the EU membership and the EU bureaucracy. As a result, aided by its 
enhanced reputation within the EU and globally, Slovenia may now enjoy a 
more productive association within the EU and better prospects of 
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SLOVENSKO PREDSEDOVANJE EVROPSKE UNIJE 
Članek podaja pregled in oceno slovenskega predsedovanja Evropski uniji 
(januar-junij 2008). Izkušnjo predsedovanja analizira tako s stališča 
pričakovanj nosilcev te naloge kot s stališča značilnosti države. Ukvarja se 
tudi s posledicami, ki jih je predsedovanje imelo na prihodnje slovenske 
odnose z Evropsko unijo in na sposobnost Slovenije, da uresniči svoje 
zunanjepolitične cilje.  
 
